Venezuela’s Gray War: A Criminal Army, a Migrant Wave, and the US ‘Invasion’?
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Venezuela’s regime under Nicolás Maduro[1] is waging a gray zone war[2] against the United States and its neighbors through irregular means. Criminal proxies, narcotics, and forced migration are no longer only side effects of state collapse—they are also tools of strategic destabilization. This article examines how Venezuela’s use of violent gangs, particularly Tren de Aragua (TdA),[3] and embedded operatives, aligns with modern hybrid warfare doctrine and poses serious security challenges for the United States and the region.
Introduction
Most outside observers still view Venezuela’s collapse as a humanitarian crisis.[4] That view is incomplete. Nicolás Maduro’s regime has adopted irregular warfare tactics—similar to those used by Russia, Cuba, China, and Iran—to weaken its neighbors and rivals without direct conflict.[5] Narcotics trafficking, forced migration, and violent gangs are being used deliberately, not incidentally.[6]
The United States is now under pressure on multiple fronts. Transnational gangs have grown stronger and political instability has spread throughout the region. The intent behind these actions matters—when a regime backs criminal networks that cross borders, disrupt communities, and undermine institutions, the result is strategic and is not coincidence.
Whether it qualifies as an “invasion” is open to debate.[7] But the old definition—tanks and troops—no longer fits today’s world. When hostile actors cross borders with the purpose of creating disorder under a regime’s direction or protection, the term may apply.[8]
This article looks at how Venezuela’s government has turned disorder into a weapon, the role of Tren de Aragua[9] in this strategy, and how the United States should respond.
Venezuela’s Gray War Strategy
Venezuela isn’t fighting a conventional war—but that doesn’t mean it’s at peace. Maduro’s regime has adopted a strategy that falls somewhere in between, relying on irregular tactics to weaken its rivals without ever firing a shot. This ‘gray zone’ warfare uses criminal networks, political disruption, and mass migration to pressure rivals while staying below the threshold of open conflict.
Over the past decade, the regime has used these tools to shift its internal crisis outward. Pushing millions to leave the country reduces strain at home and creates problems for neighbors. Drug trafficking brings in revenue and fuels instability across the region. And gangs like Tren de Aragua don’t just operate with impunity—they operate with purpose, acting as armed proxies in a broader campaign.
None of this is accidental. It’s tied to an ideology that sees the United States and liberal democracy as obstacles to be dismantled. Cuban intelligence services[10] have long influenced Venezuela’s security strategy, and groups like the São Paulo Forum give that strategy an ideological backbone.[11] The Forum brings together leftist movements from across the region and encourages the idea that US power must be challenged—by any means available.
For the Maduro regime, exporting crime and chaos isn’t just a way to stay afloat. It’s part of a long-term effort to undermine democratic governments and expand the influence of anti-US forces across Latin America.
Forced Migration as a Weapon
Nearly one in four Venezuelans—about 7.7 million people—have left the country.[12] Most people see that as a humanitarian crisis. The Maduro regime sees something else: an opportunity.
Mass migration shifts the burden outward. It overwhelms schools, hospitals, and housing in countries that take people in. It also opens space for organized crime. Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil—all of them have struggled to manage the fallout. Now the United States is dealing with it, too.
This isn’t new. One of Maduro’s closest allies, the Cubans, have done this before. In 1965, Fidel Castro opened the port of Camarioca and let thousands leave—some were dissidents, many were criminals—triggering the Freedom Flights.[13] In 1980, during the Mariel Boatlift, over 125,000 Cubans came to the US, again including large numbers released from prisons and mental institutions.[14] And in 1994, during the Balseros [rafters] Crisis, Cuba allowed tens of thousands of desperate rafters to leave, forcing Washington into tough negotiations.[15]
That history isn’t just background—it’s a model. Maduro is following it. By pushing people out, Venezuela reduces pressure at home and passes the cost to everyone else. The result is social strain, political backlash, and rising instability across the region. Remittances sent back to Venezuela—sometimes from migrants working legally, but also from criminal networks like Tren de Aragua—further entrench this strategy by adding up to $5.4 billion in 2023, accounting for approximately 6% of its GDP. These funds reached about 2.5 million households, or close to 29% of the population. Notably, around 9% of these remittances were via cryptocurrencies.[16]
Tren de Aragua: From Prison Gang to Proxy Force
Until recently, few outside Latin America had heard of Tren de Aragua. The group started inside Venezuela’s prison system but has grown into a well-organized criminal network. It now plays a central role in drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, extortion, and human trafficking across the region—including inside the United States.
In March 2025, the Trump administration designated Tren de Aragua a Foreign Terrorist Organization, stating that the group had “infiltrated the United States”[17] and was “conducting irregular warfare and undertaking hostile actions.”[18] The designation also tied the group directly to the Cártel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns)—the Maduro regime’s state-run narco-trafficking network.[19]
US intelligence reports clarify that this growth wasn’t organic.[20] Venezuelan officials have allowed, and in many cases helped, the group move north. Tren de Aragua now operates in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and throughout the US Its purpose is not just profit—it’s disruption. They bring disorder, fuel violence, and undermine the public trust. In short, they serve as a tool of irregular warfare.
And they’re not alone. The Maduro regime leads the Cartel of the Suns, a vast narcotrafficking network so deeply entrenched that the US government has charged Nicolás Maduro himself as its leader—and placed a $25 million bounty on his capture.[21] According to court filings and public indictments, Maduro helped coordinate large shipments of cocaine produced by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), also a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization.
The Maduro regime has supplied the FARC with military-grade weapons, and worked with traffickers in Honduras and elsewhere to move drugs through the region.[22] He also oversaw the training of an armed militia force in Venezuela—one that functioned as a paramilitary arm of the cartel.
None of this is distant history. It’s part of the current playbook: use criminal networks to extend state power, attack rivals, and generate income. And TdA, once just a prison gang, is now at the center.
The Danger of Escalation
So far, Venezuela’s campaign has stayed just below the line that would trigger open conflict. But gray zone warfare doesn’t stay static. It shifts, often in response to pressure. If the United States increases its efforts to disrupt the Maduro regime or its criminal partners, the response may not come through diplomacy or conventional means. It could come from inside the United States—from criminal operatives already in place, acting on orders to sabotage infrastructure or sow chaos.
Critical infrastructure would be the most obvious target—power grids, transportation systems, water supplies. Disruptions in any of these areas could cause widespread public alarm and paralyze emergency response. Large public gatherings like sporting events or political rallies are vulnerable as well. So are economic centers such as ports and supply chains, where a well-timed act of sabotage could have ripple effects across entire regions. A sudden attack could cripple local emergency services, delaying responses or causing panic and confusion.
The United States has long recognized sabotage as a core part of irregular warfare. According to the 2007 Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept irregular warfare is “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.”[23] Such attacks disrupt, delay, or destroy an adversary’s capabilities and morale—often through targeting vital systems. Venezuela already has the infrastructure in place. Its criminal networks in the US and across Latin America offer a means to strike if the regime escalates.
There’s precedent for this kind of strategy. Iran has spent decades embedding operatives through Hezbollah and its Quds Force, often utilizing commercial or religious networks to silently establish influence.[24] In Latin America, Iran has mirrored that approach, embedding assets in diaspora communities and creating logistical routes. Iran and Venezuela have joint interests—illicit financial ventures, direct flights, shared rhetoric—raise the real possibility that Iranian tactics and doctrine influence Maduro’s security services.[25]
Russia offers another point of comparison. In places like Ukraine and Georgia, Moscow used criminal networks, cyberattacks, and information warfare to destabilize targets before military operations begin.[26][27] The goal wasn’t to win quickly, but to weaken from within—to confuse, divide, and exhaust.
The concern is not that Venezuela would act alone. It’s that it has studied the playbook and built the relationships. Between the ties to Iran, Cuba, Russia, and China, and the operational networks that already exist in the Americas, the pieces are there. China, while more cautious in its public posture, has provided political cover for the Maduro regime in multilateral institutions, helped deflect sanctions, and may offer deniable support in the event of confrontation.[28]
What makes the situation even more dangerous is what has already occurred at the US border. Between 2021 and 2024, lax enforcement allowed a wide range of actors to enter the country without being screened.[29] An estimated 1.5 million “got-aways” slipped into the United States during this period.[30] It’s not much of a stretch to believe that among them were individuals tied to criminal groups and state-backed networks. Cartels and trafficking organizations—many with ties to Venezuelan operatives—almost certainly took advantage.
Meeting the Challenge
Recognizing the threat is only the first step. What matters most is what comes next. Venezuela’s campaign—strategic, criminal, and ideological—cannot be treated as a routine law enforcement problem or a nagging diplomatic dispute. This is a long-term threat, demanding a multi-pronged strategy.
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies must stop viewing groups like TdA as just gangs. They are part of a Venezuela’s broader irregular warfare effort. They act as a proxy force—operating across borders, spreading instability, and providing a source of illicit funding for the regime. They must be treated accordingly. Local roundups of street-level operators won’t be enough. The focus has to be on dismantling the networks that give them power, protection, and purpose.
Financial pressure is another critical front. The Maduro regime survives off oil revenues, drug trafficking, and illegal gold mining. Independent estimates suggest oil exports bring in around annually. Drug trafficking adds another. Gold smuggling, often tied to sanctioned operators, may be worth another or more. That cash flows through informal networks, front companies, and corrupt actors across the region and disrupting these flows should be the priority of effort.
The Maduro regime also benefits from Chinese credit lines, infrastructure investments, and state-backed transactions that shield it from Western scrutiny.[31] As the US cracks down on conventional smuggling and trafficking routes, it must also monitor Chinese-built platforms that facilitate surveillance and financial opacity, including digital currency experiments and state-aligned telecom infrastructure.
The US should make Venezuelan crude effectively radioactive in global markets—using targeted tariffs, exposing intermediaries, and revealing backdoor deals. The 25% tariff imposed by the Trump administration is a strong start, but it must be enforced with precision.[32] Violators must be identified and penalized—that’s what will have an impact on the regime. The same approach applies to gold: identify the smugglers, sanction their enablers, and disrupt the laundering networks. None of this will be easy, and progress won’t come overnight. It will take a sustained, coordinated effort. As pressure mounts, those who run these networks—often paranoid, greedy, and violent—will begin making mistakes, or turn on the regime in search of concessions or protection.
This can’t be done alone. The US should advocate for a regional coalition focused on coordination, pressure, and accountability. Countries like El Salvador, Argentina, Ecuador, Panama, and Uruguay have already dealt with the fallout too—rising crime, strained services, and political instability fueled by Venezuela’s exported chaos.[33] They need to be brought together—not in a bloated summit, but in a small, focused group willing to act. More countries can join based on their exposure to Venezuelan criminal activity.
The United States has to be proactive in its strategy. If pressure on the regime increases, it may lash out—directly or through proxies. Key infrastructure, transportation hubs, and public venues could become targets. Federal agencies and local partners should prepare now: not just for sabotage, but for another wave of forced migration in the region.
And finally, the most difficult challenge may already be inside the United States. Mapping and monitoring hostile actors—whether embedded operatives, affiliated gangs, or criminal networks—is essential. They may be quiet now, focused on trafficking or staying under the radar. But if tensions rise, they could shift quickly. In a country as open as ours, it doesn’t take much to cause real damage. Vigilance—not just after the fact, but before—is the only way to stay ahead.
Criminal groups will adapt. They always do. But the goal isn’t to eliminate every cell or stop every plan. It’s keeping them off balance—force them to make mistakes, drain their resources, and reduce their impact. That starts with understanding what this is: not just a criminal threat, but an ideological one.
Conclusion
Some may question whether irregular tactics, criminal proxies, and migration pressures constitute an invasion. However, the concept has evolved. Modern strategic thought increasingly recognizes that invasions need not involve massed armies. An invasion occurs when hostile actors, under state direction or encouragement, penetrate a rival’s territory to destabilize, disrupt, or subvert societal functions.
By this definition—and based on the regime’s use of criminal proxies, embedded operatives, and strategic destabilization—Venezuela’s campaign already meets the threshold of an irregular invasion.
Venezuela’s collapse is not simply a humanitarian tragedy. It is a theater of irregular war. Tren de Aragua’s infiltration into the United States and across the hemisphere marks the transformation of criminal actors into state-aligned proxies.
This is a gray war—quiet, subtle, and dangerous. If left unchallenged, it will continue to destabilize American society and erode the nation’s security from within. Venezuela’s hybrid invasion is underway. Whether the United States sees it clearly—and acts—will decide if it can be stopped.
Endnotes
[1] “Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro: Dictator or defender of socialism?” BBC News, 28 January 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20664349.
[2] “Report on Gray Zone Conflict 2009–2017.” US Department of State, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/266849.pdf.
[3] Chris Dalby, Tren de Aragua: The Guide to America’s Growing Criminal Threat. Virtual: World of Crime, 2025.
[4] “Venezuela Crisis: Aid, Statistics and News.” United Nations High Counsel for Refugees (UNHCR). n.d, https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/venezuela/.
[5] Moises Rendon and Claudia Fernandez. “The Fabulous Five: How Foreign Actors Prop up the Maduro Regime in Venezuela.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). 19 October 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/fabulous-five-how-foreign-actors-prop-maduro-regime-venezuela.
[6] This criminal-state interface has been called the “Joint Bolivarian Criminal Enterprise.” See Douglas Farah and Caitlyn Yates, “Turmoil in the Western Hemisphere: The Role of the Bolivarian Joint Criminal Enterprise in Latin America’s Unrest.” Perry Center Occasional Paper. Washington, DC: William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. March 2020, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-D5-PURL-gpo177170/pdf/GOVPUB-D5-PURL-gpo177170.pdf and Douglas Farah, “The Maduro Regime’s Illicit Activities: A Threat to Democracy in Venezuela and Security in Latin America.” Atlantic Council. August 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/The-Maduro-Regime-Illicit-Activities-A-Threat-to-Democracy-in-Venezuela-and-Security-in-Latin-America-Final.pdf/
[7] The weaponization of migration can be a feature of hybrid warfare. See, for example, Sean S. Costigan and Michael A. Hennessy, Eds. Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare Reference Curriculum. Brussels: Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consortium; NATO Headquarters. June 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_227643.htm, at pp. 26, 34 (re organized crime specifically), and 36.
[8] This proposition is controversial, especially under current US law. See Rebecca Ingber, “Judicial Deference and Presidential Power Under the Alien Enemies Act.” Just Security. 20 May 2025, https://www.justsecurity.org/113589/political-question-alien-enemies-act/ for an overview of the competing perspectives. In addition, for the case against ‘invasion’ see Molly Redden, “The ‘Invasion’ Invention: The Far Right’s Long Legal Battle to Make Immigrants the Enemy.” ProPublica. 23 May 2025, https://www.propublica.org/article/trump-administration-immigration-invasion-rhetoric-courts. The Trump Administration’s case is stated at Donald J. Trump, “Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of The United States by Tren De Aragua.” The White House, 15 March 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/invocation-of-the-alien-enemies-act-regarding-the-invasion-of-the-united-states-by-tren-de-aragua/. The outcome of the controversy remains subject to ongoing litigation.
[9] “Tren de Aragua.” InSight Crime. 25 April 2025, https://insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/tren-de-aragua/.
[10] “Cuba’s Intelligence Masterstroke in Venezuela.” Geopolitical Monitor. 9 August 2017, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/cubas-intelligence-masterstroke-in-venezuela/.
[11] Mike Gonzalez, “The Marxist Influence of the São Paulo Forum in Latin America.” The Heritage Foundation. 30 August 2023, https://www.heritage.org/americas/commentary/the-marxist-influence-the-sao-paulo-forum-latin-america.
[12] “Far from the Headlines: One in four Venezuelans have left the country.” United Nations Regional Information Centre (UNRIC). 30 November 2020, https://unric.org/en/far-from-the-headlines-one-in-four-venezuelans-have-left-the-country/.
[13] “Fidel Castro announces that Cubans are free to leave the island.” HISTORY. 28 September 1965, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/fidel-castro-announces-cubans-are-free-to-leave-the-island.
[14] “Mariel boatlift.” Encyclopedia Britannica. n.d, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Mariel-boatlift.
[15] Fabiola Santiago, “20 years ago, 35,000 ‘balseros’ fled Castro’s Cuba on anything that would float.” Tampa Bay Times. 18 August 2014, https://www.tampabay.com/news/humaninterest/20-years-ago-35000-balseros-fled-castros-cuba-on-anything-that-would-float/2193473/.
[16] Vince Quill, “Crypto Remittances in Venezuela Surge as Economic Situation Worsens.” Cointelegraph. 5 July 2024, https://cointelegraph.com/news/crypto-remittances-venezuela-surge-economic-situation-worsens.
[17] Op. Cit., Donald J. Trump “Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of The United States by Tren De Aragua” at Note 7.
[18] Ibid.
[19] “Cartel of the Suns.” InSight Crime. 14 May 2022, https://insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/cartel-de-los-soles-profile/.
[20] United States of America v. Nicolás Maduro Moros et al. US District Court, Southern District of New York. 26 March 2020, https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/32f71f10c36cc482/d90251dpdf.
[21] “Nicolás Maduro Moros.” United States Department of State. 10 January 2025, https://www.state.gov/nicolas-maduro-moros/.
[22] “Nicolás Maduro Moros and 14 Current and Former Venezuelan Officials Charged with Narco-Terrorism, Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Criminal Charges.” Press Release. United States Department of Justice. 26 March 2020, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/nicol-s-maduro-moros-and-14-current-and-former-venezuelan-officials-charged-narco-terrorism.
[23] “Irregular Warfare (IW): Joint Operating Concept (JOC),” Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 11 September 2007, at Section 2.a., p. 6, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joc_iw_v1.pdf and Col. Todd Schmidt, “Irregular Warfare: Defining the Debate.” Military Review. November–December 2024, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/Nov-Dec-2024/Irregular-Warfare/.
[24] Unidad Investigativa de Venezuela, “Honduras and Venezuela: Coup and Cocaine Air Bridge.” InSight Crime. 23 May 2018, https://insightcrime.org/investigations/honduras-venezuela-coup-cocaine-air-bridge/.
[25] Irfan ul Haq, “Iran and Hezbollah: Proxy Power Play.” Institute for Security and Development Policy. 26 March 2024, https://www.isdp.eu/iran-and-hezbollah-proxy-power-play/ and Moises Rendon, Antonio De La Cruz, and Claudia Fernandez, “Understanding the Iran-Venezuela Relationship.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. 4 June 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-iran-venezuela-relationship.
[26] Kateryna Zarembo and Sergiy Solodkyy, “The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare: Ukraine.” Center for European Policy Analysis. 29 January 2021, https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/the-evolution-of-russian-hybrid-warfare-ukraine/.
[27] Natia Seskuria, “Russia’s ‘Hybrid Aggression’ against Georgia: The Use of Local and External Tools.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. 21 September 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-hybrid-aggression-against-georgia-use-local-and-external-tools.
[28] Diana Roy, “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America.” Council on Foreign Relations. 10 January 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri.
[29] “Terror at Our Door: How the Biden-Harris Administration’s Open-Borders Policies Undermine National Security and Endanger Americans.” Interim Staff Report of the Committee on the Judiciary and Subcommittee on Immigration Integrity, Security, and Enforcement, US House of Representatives. 5 August 2024,https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/FILE_6538.pdf.
[30] Steven Nelson, “1.5M ‘Gotaways’ Have Slipped into the US Under Biden—Three Times as Many as During 3 Years of Trump.” New York Post. 15 May 2023, https://nypost.com/2023/05/15/1-5m-gotaways-have-slipped-into-the-us-under-biden-three-times-as-many-as-during-3-years-of-trump/.
[31] Benjamin Creutzfeldt and Parsifal D’Sola Alvarado, “Venezuela, the State That Refuses to Collapse.” Stimson Center. 16 February 2024, https://www.stimson.org/2024/venezuela-the-state-that-refuses-to-collapse/.
[32] “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes Tariffs on Countries Importing Venezuelan Oil.” The White House. 25 March 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/03/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-imposes-tariffs-on-countries-importing-venezuelan-oil/.
[33] Op. Cit., “Tren de Aragua” at Note 6.
