Analysis

Moscow Is Already Testing NATO

Nine thinkers on the future of NATO.

By , a former Lithuanian foreign minister.
A pillar with a Russian flag on it seen behind a barbed wire topped fence.
A pillar with a Russian flag on it seen behind a barbed wire topped fence.
A Russian border marker stands behind barbed wire on the border between Kaliningrad and Lithuania near Vistytis, Lithuania, on Oct. 28, 2022. Sean Gallup/Getty Images

Not all that long ago, conventional wisdom held that it would be suicide for Russia to attack NATO. Today, the Kremlin knows perfectly well that Europe lacks sufficient air defense, tanks, and artillery to fight a sustained war—and that it will take many years and substantial funding for Europe to rearm as much as it needs to. Add in the uncertainty over whether the United States will come to the aid of an ally attacked by Russia, and Europe faces its most dangerous phase in many decades.

Russia may not even need to test NATO’s capabilities in a conventional war. What if, as Sun Tzu advised, Russia is already trying to “win first and then go to war”? Moscow has normalized the idea that shadowy attacks are just part of life in Europe. Ten years ago, a single incident—like the Skripal poisoning—caused a major uproar and led to the expulsion of Russian diplomats across the West. Today, when an undersea cable is cut, civilian airliners are jammed, or explosives almost made it onto a German cargo plane, the incident is met with a weary sigh: It’s happening again.

Not all that long ago, conventional wisdom held that it would be suicide for Russia to attack NATO. Today, the Kremlin knows perfectly well that Europe lacks sufficient air defense, tanks, and artillery to fight a sustained war—and that it will take many years and substantial funding for Europe to rearm as much as it needs to. Add in the uncertainty over whether the United States will come to the aid of an ally attacked by Russia, and Europe faces its most dangerous phase in many decades.

Russia may not even need to test NATO’s capabilities in a conventional war. What if, as Sun Tzu advised, Russia is already trying to “win first and then go to war”? Moscow has normalized the idea that shadowy attacks are just part of life in Europe. Ten years ago, a single incident—like the Skripal poisoning—caused a major uproar and led to the expulsion of Russian diplomats across the West. Today, when an undersea cable is cut, civilian airliners are jammed, or explosives almost made it onto a German cargo plane, the incident is met with a weary sigh: It’s happening again.

Russia might indeed dare to test NATO further—not with tanks, but with a so-called hybrid operation from Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave tucked between Poland and Lithuania. For context, that’s the same Kaliningrad that U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently drew a blank on when questioned in Congress.

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Imagine a train traveling from Kaliningrad to Moscow through Lithuania. It malfunctions. Passengers are stranded in what Russians consider a hostile country. Russian police from Kaliningrad enter Lithuania to “assist.” Then a few soldiers join them. Then more. And suddenly, part of Lithuania is no longer under the country’s control.

Yes, a NATO member like Lithuania can invoke Article 5 at any time. But it’s never clear how allies will react. What happens during a fake rescue mission like the plausible scenario I just described? What would the United States do if its president appears to listen to the Russian leader more than his own allies? What would Europe do, as it’s still five to 10 years away from being ready to act without Washington? Would there be a response at all, or would the Western alliance dissolve with little more than a whimper?

An enemy rarely attacks in the way its victims prepare for. It strikes when and where its opponents are weakest, least prepared, and least expecting it. That’s why Europe’s preparations must be turbocharged now, not slowly phased in as they have been, inexplicably, since the start of Russia’s latest invasion. Anything else is wildly irresponsible and will get us closer to war.

Gabrielius Landsbergis is a former Lithuanian foreign minister. X: @Glandsbergis

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