Ngo Di Lan
In April 2025, the Trump administration blocked exports of Nvidia’s most advanced chip to China and soon after signed a critical minerals deal with Ukraine, securing US preferential access. These developments reflect the intensification of the Biden-era strategy of ‘techno-resource containment’.
Unlike Cold War-era containment, which was primarily driven by ideological rivalry and anchored in military alliances, techno-resource containment revolves around strategically denying access to the physical and computational foundations of future power. Instead of drawing up formal security blocs, the United States is consolidating control over the productive inputs that sustain technological, military and economic competitiveness. Washington’s aim is to cap China’s rise, preventing it from becoming the world’s dominant technological and military power.
This approach exploits two key vulnerabilities in China’s ambitious technological agenda. The first choke point is semiconductors. In 2024 alone, China imported roughly 549.2 billion integrated circuits, valued at US$385 billion. This represents a 10.4 per cent year-on-year increase, with the value of semiconductor imports exceeding China’s annual crude oil imports, which totalled US$325 billion.
While China has made remarkable strides in expanding domestic chip production, it still lags in producing the most advanced chips, where access to cutting-edge lithography tools, etch gases and design software remains tightly restricted by US and allied export regimes. Recent US policy updates have further extended these controls, adding over 140 Chinese firms to the Entity List in December 2024 and expanding regulations to cover foreign-made equipment containing US components.
China’s second major vulnerability lies in critical minerals. Though China dominates global processing — controlling approximately 90 per cent of rare earth refining and leading in battery-grade lithium, gallium and germanium production — the nation remains structurally dependent on upstream raw material imports.China itself holds less than 7 per cent of known global lithium reserves and relies heavily on shipments from Australia, Chile and Argentina to feed its battery supply chains. Similarly, many rare earth elements including the cobalt and nickel essential to Chinese manufacturing originate from Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. These regions are now at the centre of intensifying US-backed diversification efforts.
This reflects a broader US strategy — not simply to block China, but to diversify and secure global supply chains. The creation of the National Energy Dominance Council and the expansion of the Mineral Security Partnership signal Washington’s intent to reshape the global mineral landscape and blunt China’s ability to translate downstream dominance into upstream security.
Beijing, for its part, has not been passive. Huawei is preparing to mass-produce the Ascend 910C AI chip using domestic 5 nm technology. Yet despite these breakthroughs, significant technical and economic gaps remain. China’s Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation reports 5 nm wafer yields at only about one-third of those of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, and production costs may run 50 per cent higher.
Chinese firms are simultaneously accelerating efforts to develop indigenous extreme-ultraviolet lithography capabilities, with firms like SiCarrier exploring new laser-induced discharge plasma methods to generate the 13.5 nm light source needed for next-generation chip fabrication. Initial trial production is slated for late 2025, with hopes of mass manufacturing by 2026. But China will likely only partially close the gap in the near term, even under the most optimistic timelines.
For Southeast Asian countries, US techno-resource containment presents both opportunity and risk. Nations including Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines possess some of the world’s largest rare earth reserves and strategic manufacturing capabilities. This may provide leverage to negotiate favourable access arrangements and attract high-tech investment from Washington, particularly given the Trump administration’s consideration of revising Biden’s AI chip export regime.
Hesitation or inaction could lead to marginalisation, leaving these countries outside the emerging networks of strategic privilege. Unlike during the Cold War, alignment today is not primarily about political ideology or military protection — strategic alignment depends on securing access to the critical inputs of power and prosperity.
Leaning too decisively towards the United States also carries significant risks, particularly for countries that depend on stable economic ties with China. While techno-resource containment offers access and investment, it also locks countries into a system where supply chains, compute access and export privileges can be withdrawn or politicised. As Washington increasingly uses technology as leverage, partners may find themselves pressured to align with US regulatory standards or geopolitical preferences — sometimes at the expense of their own strategic autonomy.
For many Southeast Asian states whose foreign policy is built on careful hedging and economic interdependence with both powers, navigating this emerging landscape will require both strategic clarity and diplomatic agility.
Scholars have long debated whether the United States truly aims to contain China. But the past few years have made it clear that the United States is indeed containingChina — just not in the manner it once did with the Soviet Union. Rather than building formal alliances, it is constraining China’s rise by restricting access to the technologies and resources that underpin its future power. For Southeast Asia, the strategic challenge is to navigate this emerging order without becoming collateral in a great power contest where resolution remains far from certain.
Ngo Di Lan is Researcher at the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.
Source: East Asia Forum
