Village Council Violated Open Meetings Law When Firing Police Chief

When a Champaign County village police chief requested a public hearing to contest her termination, the village council violated state law by going into a closed-door session to discuss firing her, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today.

A divided Supreme Court found the Ohio Open Meetings Act, coupled with a state law outlining the process for disciplining a village police chief, entitled St. Paris Police Chief Erica Barga to have the full hearing process conducted in an open public meeting. Barga had challenged an attempt by the mayor in 2020 to fire her for insubordination and neglect of duty.

The village council conducted several hearings in public session to hear witnesses and review evidence, but entered into an executive session to deliberate on Barga’s fate. Council members emerged from closed-door discussions and cast a vote to remove Barga.

Writing for the Court majority, Justice R. Patrick DeWine stated a provision of the Open Meetings Act, R.C. 121.22(G)(1), is an exception that allows public bodies to discuss certain issues in private, including employee termination, unless the public employee requests a “public hearing.” Justice DeWine explained that if the public employee makes such a request, that means the entire process, including deliberations, must be open.

“Here, Barga requested a public hearing. Yet the village council chose to consider the charges against her in private. In doing so, it violated the plain terms of R.C. 121.22(G)(1),” he wrote.

The decision reversed a Second District Court of Appeals ruling, which sided with the village. The Court invalidated Barga’s termination and remanded the matter to the village council to conduct hearings in compliance with the law.

Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy and Justices Patrick F. Fischer and Joseph T. Deters joined Justice DeWine’s opinion.

Justice Michael P. Donnelly concurred in judgment only, warning the decision may have a chilling effect on the ability of public bodies to have full and frank deliberations regarding employment matters.

“Some deliberations are best done outside the public sphere, an obvious example being jury deliberations,” he wrote.

Justice Donnelly stated any change to the law, though, is a policy matter that the General Assembly must consider.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Melody Stewart wrote the majority is equating a “hearing” to a “meeting,” when the terms have different meanings in state law. She stated Barga received a public hearing as defined in the chief removal law, but the law does not state that the village council must deliberate in public. She noted Supreme Court precedent has found that, like a jury’s deliberations, a council can discuss a decision to terminate a chief in private after a public hearing concludes.

In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Jennifer Brunner wrote the chief removal law requires a village council to consider a mayor’s request to terminate a police chief at its next regular meeting. But the law does not say the chief has a right to request that portion of the hearing be conducted in public. Because Barga had no right to insist the council consider her termination in public, the village council was authorized to deliberate in private, she concluded.

Mayor Seeks To Remove Police Chief
Barga served as St. Paris police chief from February 2018 to November 2020. Mayor Brenda Cook placed her on administrative leave, finding Barga refused to take her direction and failed to properly perform the chief’s duties. Barga denied any misconduct and accused Cook of harassing and belittling her.

Under R.C. 737.171, a mayor may bring written charges against a village police chief, and those charges must be heard by village council at its next regularly scheduled meeting. The chief has a right to appear and defend against the charges. The chief may be removed or suspended by a two-thirds vote of council.

Cook filed five charges against Barga. The chief filed a written response and requested a public hearing to address the mayor’s charges. The hearings lasted several days, and Barga was able to testify, examine witnesses, and present evidence. Once the hearing concluded, council moved into executive session and deliberated. They returned to open session and voted to terminate Barga’s employment.

Barga appealed to the Champaign County Common Pleas Court, arguing the Open Meetings Act prevented council from deliberating in executive session after a public hearing was requested. The court affirmed council’s decision, and Barga appealed to the Second District, which also affirmed her removal.

She appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.

Supreme Court Analyzed Meeting Requirements
Justice DeWine explained the Open Meetings Act, R.C. 121.22, requires public officials to take official action and conduct all deliberations in open meetings, unless a subject matter is exempted by law. However, R.C. 121.22(G)(1) allows a public body to conduct an executive session to consider appointment, employment, dismissal, discipline, promotion, demotion, or compensation of a public employee, or to investigate charges against a public employee, unless the public employee requests a public hearing.

The Court stated the village council had to consider Barga’s termination at the next regular meeting, and under the Open Meetings Act, the village council’s regular meeting constitutes a public meeting.

“And the exception in the Open Meetings Act to hold an executive session does not apply here, because Barga requested a public hearing,”, the opinion stated.

The opinion noted the common pleas court cited the Supreme Court’s 1980 Matheny v. Frontier Local Bd. of Edn. decision, which required that a law, independent of the Open Meetings Act, must grant an employee the right to a public hearing. The common pleas court concluded the chief removal law does not include a right to a public hearing.

The Supreme Court disagreed. The opinion stated the law requires the termination proceedings to take place at the regular meeting of village council, which is a public meeting. Since Barga requested her right to be heard at the public meeting of council, nothing in the law allowed council to conduct an executive session, the opinion concluded.

The Second District took a different approach, the opinion noted. It relied on a federal district court decision, Gross v. Minerva Park Village Council, to conclude that “quasi-judicial proceedings” allow a public body to deliberate in private. The Second District found Barga’s termination hearing was a quasi-judicial proceeding, and council could deliberate in private.

The Court majority found the quasi-judicial exception was “purely judge-made law, with no basis in the text of the Open Meetings Act.” The opinion stated that expanding the exception to apply in this case “would fly in the face of the plain language of the Open Meetings Act” and would “render R.C. 121.22(G)(1) meaningless.”

“We hold that when a public employee has a statutory right to a public hearing, the plain terms of R.C. 121.22(G)(1) apply. The public body may not enter into executive session to discuss any of the statutorily-enumerated actions when the public employee requests a public hearing,” the Court concluded.

Council Can Deliberate in Private, Dissent Maintained
In her dissent, Justice Stewart noted that the chief removal law granted Barga a presentation of the charges at a hearing, the right to appear with an attorney, and the authority to examine all witnesses and contest the charges. The law states at the conclusion of the hearing, council can suspend or remove the chief or dismiss the charges. The deliberations to determine what action to take happens after the hearing and is not part of it, she explained. This law does not state or imply the council was required to deliberate in public, the dissent stated.

Justice Stewart also noted the Open Meetings Act specifically states that grand jury proceedings are not open, but the law is silent as to trial juries and judicial panels hearing cases. Yet, the historical understanding is that juries and judicial panels deliberate in private. With that as a backdrop, the Court’s prior decisions giving the same ability to public bodies conducting quasi-judicial proceedings correctly allows for private deliberations, she noted. Because Barga received a public hearing, Justice Stewart would affirm the council’s vote to remove Barga.

Chief Cannot Request Public Hearing, Dissent Asserted
To request a public hearing regarding employment, another law separate from the Open Meetings Act must provide the right to a public hearing, Justice Brunner wrote in her dissent. The chief removal law confers the right to a presentation of the charges at a hearing, the right to appear with an attorney, and the authority to examine all witnesses and contest the charges, but it does not provide a right to a “public hearing,” she noted. The removal law states the charges against the chief must take place at the next regular meeting of council. However, the law does not indicate that the portion of the regular council meeting regarding the chief’s position must take place in public.

Justice Brunner wrote that the removal law states a time and place for where the charges will be heard. But the law does not mention public hearings at all, and the law does not provide any right to request a public hearing, Justice Brunner concluded. Because the village council was not required to provide Barga with a public hearing, it did not violate the Open Meetings Act by deliberating in private, she wrote.

2023-0637. Barga v. St. Paris Village Council, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-5293.

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